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Abstract 
 
This paper argues that the ubiquitous digital 
networks in which we are increasingly becoming 
immersed present a threat to our ability to exercise 
free will.  Using process philosophy, and expanding 
upon understandings of causal autonomy, the paper 
outlines a thematic analysis of diary studies and 
interviews gathered in a project exploring the nature of 
digital experience. It concludes that without 
mindfulness in both the use and design of digital 
devices and services we run the risk of allowing such 
services to direct our daily lives in ways over which we 
are increasingly losing control.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The deployment of digital and social media 
technologies is increasingly being understood as an 
ethical issue [34] with negative intended [14] and 
negative unintended consequences [39, 41]. In this 
paper we argue that immersion in ubiquitous networks 
of digital devices that take part in co-directing our lives 
risks overwhelming the director within us.  To counter 
this risk IT mindfulness [22, 36, 42, 7, 38] is needed, 
and should be factored into design and use. 
We stress that we are not saying that the technology 
itself is somehow ‘bad’. Bad design is responsible for 
many of the issues that have been raised. However, 
with the number of algorithms and the increasing 
involvement of artificial intelligence in the running of 
these technologies, designers are no longer necessarily 
always in control themselves: algorithms can have 
unintended consequences.  With the digital, users add 
content and interact sometimes in ways unanticipated 
by designers. Mitigating risks, therefore, requires 
conscious effort, both by users, and by designers. 
However, and crucially, users may be overwhelmed by 
the digital world they inhabit, as they try to coordinate 
multiple independently designed digital devices while 
they do not and cannot have the competencies to do so, 
as the world of the digital continues to innovate at 
break-neck speed. But even if everything was good, 
and all digital and social media technologies were 
designed with the utmost care, we argue that there is 
still too much of it: that it is possible to be 
overwhelmed by too much of a good thing!  
We argue that digital events may be happening 
continuously in a way that we must better understand if 
we are to investigate and possibly mitigate negative 
consequences.  We first provide a philosophical 
position on the nature of an ‘event,’ and then consider 
what may be described as a ‘digital event.’ In the next 
section we describe a continuum between polar 
positions on how human actors and technology 
interact [24]. We then outline our methodology and 
provide examples from the empirical data and a 
thematic analysis that supports our claims.1 In the last 
section we seek to propose what might be done to 
counter the problems we have identified.  
 
2. Lenses for understanding digital events 
 
In this section, we lay out the features of the series 
of lenses, through which we examine the nature of an 
‘event,’ and then what we understand as a ‘digital 
event.’ Firstly, our analysis is based in the process 
philosophy of Henri Bergson and Alfred North 
Whitehead, and their focus upon duration, relation and 
multiplicity – upon events – rather than upon fixed 
things. In addition to this, however, we also make use 
of the image of the ‘elephant and rider’ in the moral 
psychology writings of Jonathan Haidt [13], and the 
‘philosophy of the flesh’ introduced by Lakoff and 
Johnson [21], as ways of understanding Bergson and 
Whitehead’s concerns in the language of contemporary 
psychology and philosophy. 
These lenses for understanding are then further 
refined, for the IS community, by relating insights 
from process philosophy to the causal autonomy 
dimension which stresses the relative role of human 
actors and technology in their interaction [24].  We 
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outline a continuum between pure Human Sovereignty 
(HS) and complete Technological Autonomy (TA), 
with the understandings of sociomateriality somewhere 
in the middle, and the notion of ‘infomateriality’ [18] 
closer to the Technological Autonomy end. We 
propose some refinements to this continuum supported 
by the empirical data from the project. We also make 
use of Mark Coeckelbergh’s framing of the digital as a 
space in which technology is increasingly responsible 
for some co-direction of our lives [10]. 
 
2.1 Process philosophy 
 
The two ‘fathers’ of process philosophy were 
French philosopher Henri Bergson, and British 
mathematician and philosopher Alfred North 
Whitehead. They propose ‘event-ontologies’ 
[23, p. 232], in contrast to the ‘thing-ontology’ that is 
the prevailing world view; i.e. they contend that 
‘things’ may be reduced, ultimately, to ‘events’, in 
contrast to the more positivistic approach which seeks 
not only to reduce, but to eliminate ‘events’ in favour 
of ‘things.’ Although modern physics does not “appear 
to entail” such an event ontology, it is certainly 
“consistent” with it [23, p. 234]. 
Both philosophers seek to re-integrate 
consciousness and personal experience into a scientific 
reality they regard as having banished it.  Whilst they 
both try thus to bridge the gap between subject and 
object, Bergson errs somewhat on the side of the 
subjective, and Whitehead somewhat on the side of the 
objective.  Bergson is thus the braver and more radical 
philosopher, focussing on the facility of free will and 
its place within the universe.   
2.1.1 Bergson. Of all Bergson’s core ideas, the 
durée reélle may perhaps be regarded as his primary 
insight: an understanding of the nature of time 
published as his first book, Time and Free Will [1].  
For Bergson the will is intimately linked both to 
consciousness and to duration. Free will – the ability to 
choose between different possible courses of action – 
is, for Bergson, an ontological quality of time 
understood as consciously experienced duration in 
which we play a part - the durée reélle. In mechanistic 
physics, Bergson argues, by contrast, time is a property 
of a deterministic causal closure, whereby all macro 
phenomena result inescapably from micro phenomena, 
and we – the observers – are absent, epiphenomenal, 
impotent. This mechanistic universe could run from 
beginning to end in 3 seconds or 3 trillion years: it 
would make no difference. Bergson’s durée reélle, 
however, hinges upon ‘indetermination’: the moments 
of possibility within consciously experienced duration 
when human choices can be made, and the universe 
take a different course.  This durational universe is 
making itself up as it goes along, a ‘creative evolution,’ 
(the title of Bergson’s most famous book. [2])  
 Mechanistic time, crucially, like all equations, can 
run forward or backward. Yet the nature of succession 
in consciousness flows only forward. As Bergson 
insists, this durational “succession exists, I am 
conscious of it; it is a fact” [2, p. 368] - and it is when 
free will is exercised. Our memory assists us with 
weighing up different potential routes, and then we 
choose, and action unfolds. From this, Bergson goes on 
to elaborate a universe on the model of consciousness, 
acknowledging that, for it to exist at all, it must have 
been implicit from the very beginning [3, 35]. 
2.1.2 Whitehead. Whitehead’s cosmology and 
metaphysics include his four-dimensional geometry in 
which the process of concrescence – or gradual coming 
to be and passing – of Actual Occasions into Objective 
Data is described, and an organic philosophy that 
results from this process-relational ontology.  For 
Whitehead, in the simplest terms, “the future does not 
exist” [26, p. 4].  Whitehead represents “an effort to 
think clearly and deeply about the obvious truth that 
our world and our lives are dynamic, interrelated 
processes, and to challenge the apparently obvious, but 
fundamentally mistaken, idea that the world (including 
ourselves) is made of things that exist independently of 
such relationships” [26, p. 8]. Once we have grasped 
this shift in perspective, it becomes clearer that the 
building blocks of reality are no longer fixed things but 
must be recognised as sets of interrelated events. 
Whitehead’s geometry constitutes a fourth – and 
better – description of reality than the three competing 
views in quantum mechanics: (i) that reality is 
particulate, with wave-like properties, (ii) that reality is 
wave-like, with particulate properties, and (iii) that 
nature, so determined by the means by which we study 
it, e.g. giving us position but not momentum if studied 
one way, or momentum but not position if studied 
another, is so uncertain that it is simply not “capable of 
fundamental characterisation at all” [11, p. ix]. The 
fourth approach is to focus on becoming, rather than 
being, as Whitehead does in his philosophy of events, 
created at the same time that Einstein (i), 
Schrödinger (ii) and Bohr (iii) were creating their own 
views. 
In Whitehead’s organic philosophy “everything 
experiences” [33, p. 21]. In his view, “Biology is the 
study of the larger organisms; whereas physics is the 
study of the smaller organisms” [43, p. vi].  He thus 
refuses to restrict sentience to the higher mammals and 
insists that “every singular actuality” as it takes part in 
the concrescence of new events “must be related to … 
a world of antecedent actualities. In this regard, the 
actuality is a subject whose object is a world of 
antecedent subjects” [25, pp. 11–12]. Such 
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panpsychism deems “All objects, or systems of objects, 
[to] possess a singular inner experience of the world 
around them” [33, p. 16], a world in which “experience 
is impossible without an experiencer” [35, p. 23] and 
“experiential phenomena cannot be emergent from 
wholly non‐experiential phenomena” [35, p. 21]: a 
world built, in other words, on a model of 
consciousness.   
2.1.3 A unified process approach. For Bergson, 
the idea of a homogeneous and measurable time is an 
artificial concept, a geometry for determinism.  
Duration reinserts human experience into the universe.  
Whitehead addresses this by focussing upon the notion 
of the ‘event’ as a core unit of existence, in a ‘structure 
of events’ [44, p. 52]. He speaks of “a duration” as “a 
concrete slab of nature limited by simultaneity which is 
an essential factor disclosed in sense-awareness” 
[44, p. 53].   This ‘duration’ is something that is both 
our subjective experience of an event: a non-physical 
consciousness of what is unfolding; and what the 
physico-chemical sciences would say about the 
materiality engaged in the event: the movement of 
molecules, dynamics of forces, mass, volume and 
charge of the particles engaged in what is unfolding.  
The accent is upon movement: reality is thus 
describable only in terms of ‘periods’ during which 
conscious and physical interactions and shifts occur. 
Hence the term, ‘process’ philosophy.  
The main difference between Bergson and 
Whitehead is that for the former the universe is 
qualitative and durational before it manifests itself as 
physicality, albeit that without physicality it does not 
exist.  Now, as Whitehead said, “There is very little 
large-scale understanding, even among 
mathematicians. There are snippets of understanding, 
and there are snippets of connections between these 
snippets” [45, p. 46]. This paper offers new snippets of 
connections between snippets of understanding.  
The key point arising from this philosophical 
synthesis is that the fundamental fact of conscious free 
will is inherent in the very fabric of the universe.  This 
is a universe not built upon (i) particles, (ii) waves, 
(iii) neither, nor merely upon (iv) becoming.  It is a 
universe built upon the model of consciousness, 
whereby choices are made and unfold through the 
process of becoming.  This has profound implications 
for all disciplines. 
This assertion is in keeping with the notion that it is 
in ‘events’, in becoming, that reality is truly to be 
found, rather than in things; that an event-ontology that 
entails panpsychism rings truer than the positivistic 
thing-ontology that underlies (and arguably 
undermines) so much of contemporary scientific 
thought [31].  What we perceive, moreover, as objects, 
are not “senseless, valueless, purposeless” [43, p. 17], 
but allow for affordances [17]. The physical, and 
conceptual (mental) feelings always go together, 
forming two poles within every entity, and everything 
is related to everything else. 
2.1.4 Contemporary views. More contemporary 
writers than Bergson and Whitehead provide insights 
that are strikingly in keeping with process philosophy.  
According to Haidt [13], there are two kinds of 
cognition: “the rider (controlled processes, including 
‘reasoning-why’) and the elephant (automatic 
processes, including emotion, intuition, and all forms 
of ‘seeing-that’).”  Automatic processes “run the 
human mind, just as they have been running animal 
minds for 500 million years, so they’re very good at 
what they do, like software that has been improved 
through thousands of product cycles.”  The other 
character in this dyad, “the rider, (language-based 
reasoning) evolved because it did something useful for 
the elephant.”  The rider allows us to look “into the 
future (because we can examine alternative scenarios 
in our heads) and therefore it can help the elephant 
make better decisions in the present” [13, pp. 53–54]. 
Here is Bergson’s mechanism of choice in the 
moments when our consciousness intervenes in the 
flow of the durée réelle.  It is the durational time-scale 
gap where (as Hirai [17] shows us) our ability to 
compare possible routes into the future and choose one 
literally constitutes our consciousness.   
Lakoff and Johnson [21] describe this picture as a 
Subject and a range of Selves.  “The Subject is the 
locus of consciousness, subjective experience, reason, 
will.” In addition to this, “there is at least one Self and 
possibly more. The Selves consist of everything else 
about us – our bodies, our social roles, our histories” 
[21, p. 268].  Crucially, “The Subject is that aspect of a 
person that is the experiencing consciousness and the 
locus of reason, will, and judgement, which, by its 
nature, exists only in the present” [21, p. 269 emphasis 
in original] – this is clearly the experiencer of durée 
and exerciser of free will in Bergson’s worldview. 
 Armed with these philosophical and psychological 
insights, we will now consider 'digital events’.  We 
will use the metaphor of the elephant and rider not just 
in the sense meant by Haidt, but recalling the process 
philosophy by which the rider – as Subject and as 
consciousness – expresses the free will that helps 
constitute not only ourselves but a universe understood 
upon the model of consciousness, in which such 
Human Sovereignty is a moral, ethical, and political 
good. This model of the universe, as we shall see, is 
threatened by the digital world we increasingly inhabit.  
 
2.2 Human Sovereignty and Technological 
Autonomy 
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When studying cause-effects relationships between 
human actors and IT, a spectrum of positions can be 
considered between two poles [24]. At one pole, 
“Human Sovereignty” (HS), in fact a traditional 
position, considers that “technology is an inanimate 
product of intentional human action and therefore only 
people can be viewed as causal” [24, p. 1269]. 
Technology cannot take initiatives: it strictly follows a 
plan designed by human actors. This typically applies 
to situations where decisions are the object of human 
deliberation and are supported by tools providing some 
information related to the task but not acting.  
At the other end of the spectrum, with “Technology 
Autonomy” (TA) Markus and Rowe consider that 
“technology can affect humans and operate with 
limited human intervention” [24, p. 1270]. Some 
autonomous systems such as automated transportation 
systems do not only operate without drivers but are 
regulated in highly automated ways. They are co-
piloted both by some artificial intelligence and by 
humans. However, these directive decision devices are 
designed to actively prevent human intervention into 
their operation [37]. Human surveillance may be 
necessary, but intervention remains very infrequent and 
considered only when facing a crisis situation (e.g. 
safety). When relying on deep learning, they can take a 
life of their own (we do not need to grant them with 
consciousness for that i.e. to qualify them as strong 
Artificial Intelligence) [20]. 
In between these two poles representing concrete 
and actual situations – inanimate products that simply 
inform and cannot act, and systems that can have a life 
of their own – there is a spectrum of situations. First, 
operations can be run by humans with decision aids for 
handling simple to complex tasks that may interact or 
not. By complex tasks we mean tasks that can 
encounter a considerable diversity of situations and 
actors so that their outcomes are very context 
dependent and cannot be predicted with great 
precision.   
In such cases technology can take some initiatives 
and decide within some limits what is to be done, 
beyond which humans have to intervene. We may call 
these semi-autonomous systems.  Such situations are 
typical of our digital world and the web 3.0 – the 
newly mangled internet of things and people [19, 28].  
In these situations, the objective is to regulate some 
function, or maintenance (of industry, homes, cities, 
human health conditions).  Semi-autonomous systems 
can be placed on a continuum between the above-
mentioned poles of human sovereignty aka non 
autonomous systems and technology autonomy aka 
fully autonomous systems. In the case of autonomous 
cars, one distinguishes level 1: one or a set of functions 
(e.g. cruise control) being automated with no 
interactions among them; level 2: at least two functions 
interacting automatically; level 3: temporarily the car is 
taking full control, but in complex situations the driver 
is notified to regain control; level 4: no driver is 
required, aka this is an autonomous system [15]. 
Between level 0 (HS) and level 4 (TA), three types of 
digital events can thus be experienced by the driver. 
Co-piloting or auto-pilot does not demand nor reflect 
the same physical engagement with the car and 
attention to the dashboard as we move from level 1 to 
level 3. 
In the case of autonomous cars, Bruckes et al. 
assert that "situational normality of using autonomous 
systems increases the perceived ease of use.” [5].  
However, the normality of the situation as perceived by 
users is highly debatable and does not only depend on 
the technology and its embeddedness in a (level 4) 
autonomous product but also on the environmental 
context which may include different people 
and stakeholders and connected technologies. The 
presence of other people and networked devices may 
considerably affect risk perception, capacity to 
understand and act, and reinforce a feeling of being 
overwhelmed – not so much by quantity as by 
complexity. [27]. 
Digital transformation of our lives and societies 
goes beyond moving towards higher degrees of 
technology autonomy in the sense described above 
which focuses on action. Social media and robots once 
introduced in our homes shape how our individual 
times and actions unfold in our social life and 
existence. Thus, they may give it a different meaning 
and reflect an ontological shift from a causal 
mechanism such as automation levels supporting 
action (described above) to how we constitutively 
ascribe meaning to our world and existence [24]. 
Social media puts us frontstage “acting in a play that is 
not only written by me but also by others and by the 
technologies and media I use” [10, p. 35]. We do not 
only set the targets for driving somewhere, for 
maintaining our homes at certain temperatures and 
refilling our refrigerators, the digital tools we use also 
create other unexpected interactions that shape our 
lives in what we do (or continue to do) and don’t, and 
the sequence in which we do things and ascribe 
meaning to what we ordinarily do such as getting up in 
the morning. “Technology is not just something we use 
in our performances [...] and not even just a potential 
co-actor (actant), but also an author and director of 
these performances” [10, p. 27]. To what extent is it an 
author of our lives? To what extent does it set certain 
goals indirectly by switching our attention or directly 
by certain impositions? 
2.2.1 Digital events as co-directors. In 
Whitehead’s philosophy we can see that an ‘event’ is 
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unbounded; Whitehead’s temporal geometry shows 
how for any event, there is a beginning which involves 
everything around it, a middle which is always a 
process, and an end which involves passing into a past 
where it becomes the stuff from which other events are 
made. Crucially, the present is where subjectivity 
resides, the past being the objects from which it is 
made up: a panpsychic level of consciousness 
permeates all interrelations, and all events contain and 
are contained within other events. The boundaries 
between events thus become almost indistinguishable 
in a field of continuously unfolding, interpenetrative 
and interoperable multiplicity.  Focussing upon the 
discrete reveals only one perspective; acknowledging 
the multiple provides a glimpse of the complexity and 
contingency of the real. 
We see that Digital Events are also unbounded 
through their interactions, in this manner.  Along the 
continuum from Human Sovereignty to Technological 
Autonomy, we have therefore identified three distinct 
gradations, to which we have given a nomenclature of 
DE1, DE2, and DE3, denoting three kinds of Digital 
Events along that continuum, whilst acknowledging 
that finer gradations might also be delineated, through 
further examination. 
 
Table 1 Typology of Digital Events 
Digital 
Event 
Definition 
DE0 Products that simply inform and cannot act 
DE1 One or more automated functions with no 
interactions among them 
DE2 Minimum two functions interacting 
automatically 
DE3 The system taking full control temporarily 
though in complex situations the human is 
notified to regain full control 
DE4 Autonomous system. No human required  
 
Digital Events of type 1 (DE1) – using third-party 
applications on the platform devices in our hands that 
source assets and processing from remote servers – are 
commonplace and not the focus of this paper.  DE2 – 
where two or more services or functions are interacting 
with each other in the background – have also become 
so commonplace we hardly notice them. DE3 are 
typical of the Web 3.0 A.I.-powered future we are 
being invited to embrace, and which in this paper we 
are concerned may require risk-mitigating design 
and/or use focus.  As with events in Whitehead’s 
ontology, the boundaries between these types of digital 
events are indistinct, and each contain and are 
contained by other digital events.  
Thus, in contemporary highly technological 
society, we contend, there are unbounded digital events 
that are increasingly immersive and ubiquitous – closer 
to DE3 than to DE1 – whose obligations upon us seem 
to weigh as heavily as those related to our peers: where 
the digital tools we use become co-directors of our 
lives as powerfully as other people – and indeed 
constitutively causal in the development of the Selves 
surrounding the Subject who is experiencing; our 
becoming ourselves is co-constituted not only by those 
around us, but by these digital events.   
Nor are they always benign. Already in our 
experience of what seem like DE2 Events, such as 
engaging with social media on our smartphones, 
elements of what defines DE3 events are at play. Nir 
Eyal [12] describes how “The technologies we use 
have turned into compulsions, if not full-fledged 
addictions. It’s the impulse to check a message 
notification. It’s the pull to visit YouTube, Facebook, 
or Twitter for just a few minutes, only to find yourself 
still tapping and scrolling an hour later. It’s the urge 
you likely feel throughout the day, but hardly notice” 
[12, p. 1]. The ‘hook’ model [12, p. 4] he describes 
“brings together an understanding of user behaviour 
and a carefully considered set of interactions that 
entice people into using a product or service more and 
more. If you can connect a user’s need (unconscious or 
otherwise) with your service frequently enough … the 
user will begin to form a habit of using it.” [6 p.67]. By 
repeatedly looping through the steps, “the user begins 
to associate the behaviour with their own internal 
motivations and emotions” [12, p4] These habits are 
self-reinforcing through reward and admonishments. 
Such ‘hooks,’ in the context of our philosophical 
lenses, can be read as a case of technologies driving the 
elephant, of the system of elephant-computer 
interaction taking temporary full control, 
overwhelming what might be the more considered – 
conscious and durational - intentions of the rider.  This 
is nearer to DE3 than to DE2. All too often it is the 
deliberate intent of the designer to appeal directly to 
the elephant, sidestepping the rider through carefully 
integrated psychological tricks [32].  There is a 
growing amount of literature on the ways in which 
social networks, in particular, undertake this kind of 
trickery [e.g. 40]. 
When we say, then, when asked, that we are 
acquiescent to the tricks of digital companies like 
Facebook, that we understand they use our data 
because they are a business, is our surrender not also a 
surrendering of an awareness of the risks involved?  If 
we are, as Haidt and Lakoff and Johnson show, all too 
often guided rather by the elephant than the rider, when 
we are immersed in DE3 type networks that are geared 
toward driving the elephant, just who is in control? Is 
our consciousness making choices, or are the automatic 
processes of our bodies being led by automated hooks? 
Page 6137
  
There is a tangible danger of our ability to choose 
being overwhelmed when too many DE3s are present. 
This constitutes a modification to Coeckelbergh’s 
co-direction: it suggests that in the right (or wrong) 
circumstances, we are no longer co-directing our own 
lives, but subject to the hooks, tricks, and controls of 
the ubiquitous digital environments in which we are 
immersed: that our lives are being directed. While this 
may be reasonable in certain circumstances, more and 
more digital events are occurring beyond DE3 type 
events at the Technological Autonomy end of the 
spectrum. If true, this leads us to refine our socio-
technical perspectives. In particular, not only the 
human-centred human sovereignty ideal may have 
become a modern demagogical myth, but the academic 
perspective on sociomateriality may soon be outdated. 
First, at the heart of this latter perspective is the idea 
that the social and the material cannot be distinguished 
fundamentally [29]. However, sociomateriality does 
not sufficiently and precisely reflect the nature of the 
tools that have become constitutive of the physical 
context in which we live. This a world which we have 
made and are rapidly remaking, through a digital 
transformation process which represents an 
anthropogenic shift. We argue only the notion of the 
‘infomaterial’ truly acknowledges the key element of 
human meaning already inherent within ‘information’ 
[8, 18] as causal [24]. Second, based on process 
philosophy we argue that, unlike sociomateriality, 
infomateriality focuses more upon the physical and the 
durational, and less upon ephemeral social ‘structures.’ 
 
3. Methodology 
 
With a tight timescale of only a few months, this 
study was more a proof-of-concept pilot of what and 
how people experience the physical and durational in 
their digital world and where digital events fit in the 
HS→TA continuum than a full study, and was focused 
on obtaining quality in-depth information.  We were 
conscious that when seeking information on digital 
experience there are a number of ‘digital divides’ to 
consider, including in the younger generation, for 
whom the digital world is something they have grown 
up with; education and family income remain key to 
access beyond the cheapest smartphones with limited 
data allowance.  If this younger generation, we 
reasoned, were finding new technologies encroaching 
upon their conscious ability to direct their own lives, 
then surely other, older generations, would be finding 
this even more so.  We recruited, therefore, a small 
cohort of participants, aged 18-25, from both IT and 
non-IT backgrounds, aiming to garner responses 
representing a spectrum from digital novice to in-depth 
knowledge and experience of the digital world. Diary 
studies were undertaken with a total of 12 participants. 
Diaries lasted typically for 4-6 weeks, with 2-3 entries 
per week, and 2 interviews were then undertaken.    
Thus, although our participants were not a 
statistically representative cohort, we were able to 
infer, from our knowledge of the participants, that a 
reasonably wide range of backgrounds, income 
brackets, and educational levels were represented, as 
well as a reasonable gender balance. Interviews were 
recorded, typed by an independent transcriber, and then 
imported into NVivo.  An interview plan was drawn up 
in advance, dividing each simply into three parts: 
(i) follow-on questions arising from their diary entries, 
(ii) privacy issues around online services in general, 
(iii) opinions on personal online digital experience. 
 
4. Findings 
 
Our analysis made use of a priori themes: the 
framework on digital events described in section 2, 
with Eyal’s notion of the ‘hook,’ Haidt’s metaphor of 
elephant and rider, the HS→TA spectrum, and the 
process philosophy of Bergson and Whitehead. With 
all the diary entries and interviews entered into NVivo, 
we employed search terms with NVivo synonyms and 
coded the data using thematic analysis [4]. Our coding 
was thus not an inductive process. Through this 
analysis we hope to approach a philosophical 
explanation, not yet a theory, that speaks to the IS 
community.  
 
4.1 Single and multiple events 
 
Although participants were asked to describe in 
their diary entries their experience of discrete digital 
events on a single digital device, in a finding redolent 
of the unboundedness of digital events, and the 
richness and complexity of people’s digital 
interactions, we found that  the 75 diary entries in fact 
describe multiple digital events across a range of 
applications on their devices. Not one of the entries 
describe single discrete digital events.  Some 68% of 
entries describe several discrete digital events taking 
place at the same time within the one device. A third 
category - the other 32% - describe several non-distinct 
or combined simultaneous digital events involving 
multiple applications. For us this means that the digital 
event world – especially of this latter group - is more 
multiple and continuous than made of single discrete 
and unique events, and this is very redolent of 
Whitehead’s process-relational vision of events in 
general.  
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4.2 From directing, to co-direction to being 
directed?  
 
In our thematic analysis, we found that the data 
demonstrates all three types of digital events. In Table 
2 we present example diary entries for each. 
 
Table 2 Examples of Digital Event Types 
Digital 
Event 
Example [participant code] 
DE1 I'm using my iPhone to listen to music - 
Spotify. I generally listen to the "Daily 
Mix" playlists that are personalised for me 
on my previous usage. Extremely good and 
the playlists generally get better the longer 
you use Spotify for. [A3-26] 
DE2 I enjoy the simplicity of being able to login 
with one account and have access to all of 
these different tools simply by being logged 
into Chrome. [A3-26] 
DE3 I feel like we probably take all these 
services for granted like Gmail, Yahoo or 
whoever it is nowadays and we think, ‘oh, 
we can trust them, they can take decisions 
for us and will make sure that we receive 
the right emails in our inbox and everything 
that is spam will go into the junk folder’.  I 
believe maybe they should do it from time 
to time, like an update of settings or 
something… Two weeks ago I switched my 
bank and I was receiving the emails in my 
inbox for the first few days and then I was 
expecting a status on the switch process and 
I didn’t receive anything. I had to ring them 
and they said everything is fine and I don’t 
usually check my spam folder and I 
checked it and all the emails after that went 
to my junk.  I missed out on something 
because there was a direct debit that was 
supposed to come through and because I 
didn’t receive the email on time I missed 
out on that so I had to pay a bit over… [A3-
16] 
 
In the DE1 example there is a simple engagement 
with a single function on the smartphone – Spotify – 
that delivers music from that service.  In the DE2 
example multiple services are used together to provide 
benefits to the user, with a consistent experience of all 
tools being provided through a single login.  In the 
DE3 example, however, the participant is very clear 
that they want to retain autonomy and control, rather 
than give it over to a third-party email provider. The 
administration process for a new banking customer is 
highly or at least partly automated. At the stage 
referred to in this quote, A3-16, the customer, is 
probably expected to sign some documents that are 
being sent automatically, and/or be informed of this 
direct debit. However the fact that (s)he is only 
informed by email and that quite late, because it went 
into his/her spam folder, has several negative 
consequences (being worried, calling the bank, having 
to check the spam folder, having to pay more) that 
could have been avoided if (s)he had been contacted by 
the bank to inform him/her that the switch had been 
made. It is clear that had the participant had better 
control of the situation, there would have been fewer 
problems.  Has free will been properly exercised 
through this mesh of interconnected automated 
systems? Or has automation interfered and thwarted 
conscious direction? 
The analysis of the data is thus suggestive of the 
phenomenon of co-direction identified in Section 2, in 
instances of participants’ feeling a lack of control.  For 
example, the diary entries in Table 3 represent several 
nuanced aspects of control. 
 
Table 3 Examples of control issues 
I will use the phone throughout the day to speak to 
my girlfriend and friends while also checking social 
apps during lunch and breaks and the occasional bit 
of shopping (Amazon, eBay etc.). (A1-39) 
Today I used Instagram a lot as some of my friends 
are on holiday and they were uploading videos and 
pictures on their Instagram... however seeing all of 
these videos from several friends enjoying 
themselves whilst I was at work made me feel quite 
down and like I was missing out on things. (A1-31) 
There are bits of the old way of doing things I still 
prefer doing like switching my thermostat on 
manually rather than having a Hive or a Nest 
controlling that.  Or I prefer using the remote control 
to switch to a channel instead of asking for Alexa to 
do that for me. (A3-16) 
 
In the case of A1-39 it should be noted that 
‘checking’ can all too often be read as symptomatic of 
a ‘fear of missing out’ (FOMO) [30], a well-known 
psychological trait of addictive behaviour, and clearly 
an example of Eyal’s ‘hooks’ at work.   
Most importantly however, the analysis revealed a 
number of examples of feeling overwhelmed by digital 
experience, as in the case here of A1-31, whose lack of 
control brings on the depression aspect of FOMO, and 
in particular A3-16 who prefers to retain conscious 
control rather than cede simple tasks to a digital 
assistant. As we move towards DE3 types of events 
and closer to automated systems such as Hive, Alexa 
or Nest, A3-16 exhibits a perception that there is a risk 
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in surrendering our awareness and control to such 
systems.  
With certain systems such as social networks, then, 
we may get depressed because we feel we have to 
check, but checking does us no good. With other 
automated systems that are based on relieving us from 
the task of checking such as Hive, Alexa or Nest, we 
can get worried that it may not be trustworthy and that 
we will have to control/check it. What is common in 
these apparently contrasting examples is that when we 
feel we have to or would have to control/check more 
than we would normally, we are in fact dissatisfied. 
This control/checking issue is generated by the digital 
society. 
Conscious control and a lack of control, therefore, 
are issues our participants are concerned with 
regarding some types of digital events.  Situations in 
which we direct our technologies to serve us, becoming 
situations in which new technologies seem to be 
increasingly co-directing our activities, need to stay 
short of situations in which our technologies are 
directing our activities. 
 
5. Mindfulness  
 
How then do we counter these problems?  Bergson 
scholar Yasushi Hirai suggests that “In terms of digital 
events, it might be worth reconsidering the time-
efficiency fundamentalism of technology: it risks 
decreasing the heterogeneity, i.e. thickness, of our 
various timescales, which is the very ground for our 
mindful enjoyment of experience.” [17] Time, in other 
words, and the mindfulness with which to experience 
it, is, in Hirai’s reading of Bergson for the 21st century, 
the very essence of our free will, of our ability to be the 
rider of the elephant and direct it as we will.  Our daily 
experiences encompass but go beyond digital events 
and require a general mindfulness. In the context of 
digital events, then, an ‘IT mindfulness’ is required. 
Brown and Ryan define mindfulness as “The state 
of being attentive to and aware of what is taking place 
in the present” [7, p822]. While Thatcher et. al.’s 
conceptualization of IT mindfulness is clearly that of a 
trait, Brown and Ryan’s conceptualization of 
mindfulness is that of both a state and a trait. [38, 7, 
p824]. Both consistent with Weick and Putnam [42] 
and Brown and Ryan [7], we define IT mindfulness as 
an open awareness of and attention to current digital 
experience which may be reflected in a more regular or 
sustained consciousness of ongoing events, and which 
allows sufficient time and awareness to make informed 
choices. Without that time and IT mindfulness – in a 
fast-paced world of constant digital stimulation – the 
rider is at risk of being overwhelmed by the elephant, 
and the elephant driven by the many stimuli around it, 
not by ourselves.    
Mindfulness, in the IS and Organisational literature, 
has been largely of what Weick and Putnam describe 
as a Western, conceptual, flavour [42, 22].  They quote 
Gunaratana to describe the more Eastern conception: 
“Mindfulness is very much like what you see with your 
peripheral vision as opposed to the hard focus of 
normal or central vision. Yet this moment of soft, 
unfocussed awareness contains a very deep sort of 
knowing that is lost as soon as you focus your mind 
and objectify the object into a thing.”[42] This is very 
redolent of Bergson’s intuition philosophique [3, p33], 
by which the objectification performed by the intellect, 
looking back on what has passed, can be superseded by 
a more Gestalt awareness of durée reélle in the now. 
This is in keeping with the impermanence implicit in 
the Eastern conception of mindfulness. Gunaratana 
says, again, “there are really no entities that are 
unchanging or permanent, only processes.” [42]. By 
the same token, however, the more Western conception 
of mindfulness, represented principally by the work of 
Langer, chimes better with Haidt’s image of rider and 
elephant, and the dangers of acting on “automatic 
pilot.” [42, 22].  As Weick and Putnam conclude, then, 
there is scope for us to “transcend the constraints of 
conceptual mindfulness and incorporate Eastern 
insights” [42].  Process philosophy, we argue, offers 
just such scope. 
Participants in the project spoke of taking time out, 
through distancing themselves from their digital 
devices for periods of time, switching off in order to 
focus on the simpler pleasures of words on paper. They 
expressed a desire to stay mindful to their experience, 
and not to the demands of the digital. Interestingly, 
some of their digital experiences were leading to 
delusion [42] and fear of being abused (see Table 4). 
 
Table 4 Examples of Mindfulness / Delusion 
Today I browsed on the dating app Tinder too 
just looking… Hopefully meet someone off it but I 
never feel that positive about it. The app is not really 
enjoyable because everyone feels disposable in a 
way. It's easy to use but there's not much to it. 
Literally a swip[e] to the left or right. For that reason 
I don't use the app that much. (A1-31) 
I am not into all these Alexas/Nest that is privacy 
again, Alexa I heard stuff, Alexa listening to you all 
the time, to your conversations in the house and 
targeting adverts depending on what you’ve talked 
about and I don’t want to do that, or Hive knowing 
what time I’m home, you know, when I am in work 
and stuff like that.  So, what is private?  As long as I 
can control it I will try and do that. (A3-16) 
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Clearly, for A1-31, there is both a habitual – hook-
driven - behaviour, and a consciousness and resistance 
to that habitual behaviour, in their relationship with the 
dating app. For A3-16 the prospect of being listened to 
by Smart Home assistants is very off-putting.  In both 
these cases the participants express a sense that their 
digital experiences in some sense dehumanise – 
making people feel ‘disposable’ or lacking privacy. So, 
switching off our digital devices from time to time in 
order to listen to our own elephant rider, we would 
argue, is an example of the kind of moderation 
foregrounded by many moral philosophies [16]. 
In today’s world of digital events, then, resistance 
to the fateful allure that is not only possible but sought 
by many of the technologies around us becomes key. 
Reading, exercising and other involvements instead of 
smartphones, along with the non-adoption of some 
technologies seen as clearly overstepping certain 
boundaries, all express concerns about being 
sufficiently in control of the digital influences in order 
to be able to put them down, to have ‘me time’. 
The future does not exist, and the universe is 
making itself up as it goes along – through our 
consciousness.  These are the primary lessons from 
process philosophy.  The Mindfulness required of us, 
then, is clearly of existential importance. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
‘Infomateriality’, we contend, is a notion by which 
we might understand the true nature of the ubiquitous, 
always-on computational world information systems 
have brought about, in which digital events are 
unfolding at all times, all around us, to us, by us, 
between us.  It may be understood as a condition of 
human societies in which our exchange of information, 
and the digital tools with which we undertake that 
exchange, have become co-constitutive of the physical 
context in which we live, and are increasingly 
becoming co-directors of our lives.  
The responses from the participants in our project, 
confronted with the unique synthesis of Bergson and 
Whitehead’s process philosophies and the other lenses 
we have used for our thematic analysis, as this paper 
has demonstrated, bear this out.  
‘Infomateriality’ returns individual experience to a 
centrality of scientific understanding from which it has 
been wrongly banished, alongside the broader social 
and material conditions our analyses may explore, in 
our understanding of what information is, what 
material reality is, what it is like, and how the 
enactment of information is constitutive of individuals, 
societies, and the materiality of the world we inhabit.  
The infomaterial is thus a concept for today’s 
“always on” digital world, and enjoins us, as designers 
and users of information systems, (i) to make room for 
mindfulness, and (ii) to approach our work as 
technologists with the strongest ethical principles, 
cognizant of the co-directional power of the 
technologies we deploy into people’s lives.   
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